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ABSTRACT
Tracing the creation and (re)production of Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority (IDA)
through the lens of path dependence theory, the story charts the IDA’s creation within
protectionism. In parallel with the gradual shift away from protection towards free trade, the
story follows the IDA’s emergence as the state’s pre-eminent industrial development agency, its
re-creation as a state-sponsored organisation and the growing political, institutional and
monetary resources afforded it in return for delivery on objectives, largely in the shape of new
job creation. However, the increasing reliance on foreign investment to meet targets, at the
expense of indigenous industry, eventually surfaces as a challenge in the early 1980s and
culminates in the IDA being split into separate agencies in 1994. Today, supporting exportoriented, foreign multinational organisations, which employ some 136,000 people and account
for some for €110bn or 70 per cent of total exports, and continuing to promote and attract inward
investment (IDA, 2010), IDA Ireland remains an important organisation in the Irish enterprise
development institutional landscape.
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INTRODUCTION
Taking path dependence as a lens (see Donnelly, 2009), this chapter traces the creation and
(re)production of Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority (IDA). The story that unfolds takes
as its starting point Ireland’s turn to protectionism following the general election of 1932,
charting the increasing investment by successive Governments in the machinery of protection
and the creation of the IDA in 1949 as an autonomous agency within an institutional matrix
focused on protection. The story then moves on to tell of the gradual shift away from protection
towards free trade, a repositioning that witnessed the emergence of the IDA as the pre-eminent
agency of state dealing with industrial development and its re-creation as a state-sponsored
organisation. Throughout the course of time, the story traces the growing commitment to the
IDA in terms of political, institutional and monetary resources, with the IDA in turn reinforcing
that commitment through delivery on its objectives, largely in the shape of new job creation.
Essentially, the story is illustrative of increasing returns reinforcing the chosen path of industrial
development, itself reinforcing the IDA as the principal instrument through which such
development occurs.

However, as the story continues to unfold, the increasing reliance on

foreign investment to meet targets, at the expense of indigenous industry, eventually surfaces as
a challenge to the IDA in the early 1980s and culminates in the IDA being split into separate
agencies in 1994, namely Forfás, IDA Ireland and Forbairt (now Enterprise Ireland). To read a
more detailed account, see Donnelly (2007: 109-271).
Forfás is the policy advisory and co-ordination board for enterprise, trade and science and
technology in Ireland, and in it are vested the state’s legal powers for industrial promotion and
the development of trade and technology. Through Forfás, powers are assigned to Enterprise
Ireland for the development and promotion of the indigenous industry sector and to IDA Ireland
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for the promotion of inward investment. Prior to moving on to the IDA story proper, a brief
insight into path dependence theory would be of benefit.

PATH DEPENDENCE AS LENS
Recognising calls for more processual and historically informed theorising, path dependence
theory (Arthur, 1994; David, 1985, 1987, 1994; North, 1990) offers a way of articulating the
organisational as an ongoing dynamic over more dominant ways of thinking and knowing that
are more static. Those who are not familiar with the path dependence approach think that it is no
more than recognition that ‘history matters’, such that path dependence is equated with ‘past
dependence’ (Antonelli, 1997).

However, path dependence characterises a special type of

organisational process, at the heart of which is an entrapping process that, over time and (partly)
dependent on prior choices and events, radically limits the scope of action (Sydow, Schreyögg
and Koch, 2009). Viewed as an idea through which ‘history’ is commonly made visible, the path
dependence approach holds that a historical path of choices has the character of an irreversible
branching process with a self-reinforcing dynamic in which positive feedback increases, while at
the same time the costs of reversing previous decisions increase, and the scope for reversing
them narrows sequentially, as the development proceeds. Thus, preceding steps in a particular
direction induce further movement in the same direction ‘because the relative benefits of the
current activity compared with other possible options increase over time’ (Pierson, 2000: 252,
emphasis in original), thereby eventually leading into a non-reversible state of total inflexibility
or lock-in (David, 1985).
As Mahoney (2000: 511) notes, path-dependent analyses have at least three defining
characteristics: (1) they entail the study of causal processes that are very sensitive to events that
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occur early on in an overall historical sequence; (2) given the contingent character of these early
historical events, they cannot be explained by reason of preceding events or initial conditions;
and (3) when contingent historical events occur, path-dependent sequences are reflected in
essentially deterministic causal patterns. Adapting Mahoney (2001:112), these characteristics are
elaborated into an analytic structure based on his view that path dependence refers ‘to a specific
type of explanation that unfolds through a series of sequential stages’, as shown in Figure 1
below.

Figure 1: Analytic Structure of Path-dependent Explanation
Antecedent
conditions
Historical
factors that
define
available
options and
shape selection
processes

Critical
juncture
Selection of a
particular
option from
among many
alternatives

Structural persistence
Selfreinforcing
processes –
production and
reproduction of
the selected
option

Lock-in –
production and
reproduction of
the selected
option

Path persists

Reactions and
counterreactions to the
selected option

Reactive
sequence

Resolution of
conflict
generated by
reactions and
counterreactions

Outcome

Critical juncture – path
broken – new option
Selfreinforcing
processes –
production and
reproduction of
the selected
option

Lock-in –
production and
reproduction of
the selected
option

Structural persistence

(Source: Adapted from Mahoney, 2001: 113)
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Antecedent conditions refer to historical factors that define available options and shape
selection processes. These conditions characterise a wide range of action, where decisions made
cannot be predicted by past events or initial conditions. However, to a degree, antecedent
conditions are also influenced by the past (Child, 1997), in that they are influenced by
historically framed and imprinted contingency and not by wholly unrestricted choice (Sydow,
Schreyögg and Koch, 2009). Reflecting antecedent conditions, then, at least two options are
open for selection at the critical juncture, which represents the point when one option is chosen
and the dynamics of self-reinforcing processes are set into motion.
The choice is consequential because it leads to the creation of an evolving and narrowing
organisational path that, building into structural persistence, becomes increasingly difficult to
reverse over time. It is here that positive feedback or increasing returns become active through
self-reinforcing dynamics of set-up or fixed costs (the higher the costs, the greater the incentive
for individuals and organisations to stay on path), learning effects (experience of an existing path
leads to higher returns from its continuing use), coordination effects (benefits of a given path
increase as others adopt the same option) and adaptive expectations (self-fulfilling character of
‘picking the right horse’) (Arthur, 1994: 112). Thus it is that, once a specific selection has been
made, it becomes increasingly difficult with the passing of time to return to the initial critical
juncture when at least two options were still available.

As noted by Arthur (1989, 1994),

increasing returns to adoption are realised not at a single point of time but rather dynamically,
such that each step along a particular organisational path produces consequences that increase
the relative attractiveness of that path for the next round. As effects begin to accumulate, they
generate a powerful cycle of self-reinforcing activity, contributing to lock-in, such that flexibility
becomes severely constrained and the organisational path is fixed and takes on a quasi-
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deterministic character. Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch (2009) suggest that organisational paths,
due to their social character, require a modified conception of lock-in. Thus, instead of a fully
determined lock-in, Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch (2009: 695) argue for conceiving of lock-in ‘as
a matter of degree, accounting for variance in the actual practicing of the organizational path’.
The continued existence of an organisational path over time has the potential to activate a
sequence of causally linked events that, when activated, materialise separately from the factors
that originally produced the path. In such reactive sequences (Mahoney, 2001), which comprise
chains of events that are both temporally ordered and causally connected, the final event in the
sequence is the outcome of interest. A reactive sequence is often set in motion by an initial
challenge to the existing organisational path, with counter-reactions to this opposition then
driving ensuing events in the sequence. Reactive sequences are typically marked by properties of
reaction and counter-response, as patterns put in place during critical juncture periods are
resisted or supported. Although such resistance may not be path breaking, it can trigger an
outcome or critical juncture that results in the development of a new organisational path. With
the above framework in mind, we now turn to the IDA’s story.

EMERGING WITHIN PROTECTIONISM: CREATING THE IDA
With a sluggish economy, the Great Depression in train and economic nationalism on the rise
internationally, two possible paths to economic development were on the table at the time of the
1932 Irish general election, namely, free trade or protectionism. With the protectionist platform
winning the day, the new government embarked on a path that continued in force for almost two
and a half decades, underpinned by Fianna Fáil, the party advocating protectionism, winning five
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successive general elections and remaining in power for almost two decades (see Figure 2
below).

Figure 2: The Protectionist Path, 1932-1958
Antecedent Conditions
Sluggish economy
Great Depression denting appeal of free trade policy
Economic nationalism
Critical Juncture
1932 General Election – party advocating protectionism (Fianna Fáil)
defeated party advocating continuing free trade (Cumann na nGael)
Structural Persistence (1932-1948)
Fianna Fáil held power for 16 years (5 successive general elections).
Building and bolstering protectionist institutions – legislation and supporting organizations.
Appeals to economic nationalism.
Economic War with Great Britain.
Emergency (1939-46).
Reactive Sequence (1948-1958)
Inefficiency of protectionism
Saturated domestic market
Migration from land
Increasing unemployment
Increasing emigration
Deteriorating balance of payments

Maintain protection, but more expansive/ proactive
industrial policy:
-New organizations (IDA, Córas Tráchtála Teoranta,
An Foras Tionscal)
-Fiscal and capital incentives
-Promote indigenous industrial development
-Promote exports / FDI
Plus, moves internationally dismantling protectionism in favor of free trade, ie, GATT, ECSC, EEC, EFTA

Emergence and early path of IDA (Figure 3)

(Source: Donnelly, 2007: 148)
As it was, Fianna Fáil invested significant political capital in protectionism as the means
to achieving economic independence, appealing to economic nationalism and engaging in an
economic war with the Great Britain (Kennedy, Giblin and McHugh, 1988). Additionally, the
government set about building the protectionist machine through passing legislation and
establishing appropriate organisations.

Through layering (Thelen, 2003), legislation (e.g.,

Control of Manufactures Act, 1932; Control of Prices Act, 1932; Control of Imports Act, 1934)
and supporting organisations (e.g., Industrial Credit Corporation, 1933; Prices Commission,
1937) were added to partially re-negotiate elements of the protectionist machinery, while at the
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same time strengthening it in the process. These various legislative moves also exhibit learning
effects, as can be seen in the adaptations made to various pieces of legislation constituting the
machine (e.g., Control of Manufactures Act, 1934; Control of Prices Act, 1937; Control of
Imports Act, 1937). The investment in these legislative and organisational assets, which were
specific to protectionism, added to the resilience of the institution and deepened the equilibrium
established by the turn to self-sufficiency.

Further, coordination effects and adaptive

expectations were evident in the support for this infrastructure, not just by government, but also
by industrialists.
By the late 1940s, protectionism was coming under pressure because of its inefficiency,
the saturated domestic market, migration from the land, increasing unemployment and
emigration, and a deteriorating balance of payments (PDDE, Vol.119, Cols.1584-1585, 9-March1950).

While continuing with the policy of protectionism, a new Fine Gael-led inter-party

government (1948-51) sought to combat its ills through engaging a more proactive industrial
policy centred in a new organisation, the IDA (Irish Independent, 1949: 5; PDDE, Vol.119,
Col.1586-1595, 9-March-1950). In establishing the IDA in 1949, the government chose between
establishing an autonomous body and the existing civil service arrangements, opting for the
former and investing in a path to bring about its creation (see Figure 3 below). That path
involved high set-up costs, not to mention adaptive expectations, entailing negotiating the
proposal within government and the civil service and then selling the idea to the media, to
industrialists, to members of the coalition parties and to party faithful. It entailed recruiting the
IDA executive (i.e., Authority) members and establishing the IDA as an administrative body in
advance of any legislation passing through the Oireachtas, itself a large investment should the
initiative have failed in its passage through the legislative process at any of the formal veto

8

points. It entailed drafting legislation and steering passage of same through the legislative
process, with succeeding stages dependent on passage of preceding stages first. Indeed, in
proposing legislation to the Oireachtas, government had to be sure that it would have the support
of its own members to ensure safe passage, whatever about the position taken by the opposition.

Figure 3: The IDA’s Early Path
Protectionism reactive sequence (Figure2)

Antecedent Conditions
Inefficiency of protectionism; Migration from land; Increasing
unemployment; Increasing emigration; Deteriorating balance of payments.
Critical Juncture
Newly elected Inter-Party Government chose a new organization, the IDA, over the
Department of Industry and Commerce to further industrial development.
Structural Persistence (1949-1950)
Investment in proposal development, positioning and communication of proposal to party
members, media, industrialists, public.
Recruitment of Authority members and establishment of IDA as administrative body.
Drafting and passage of legislation through Oireachtas.
Reactive Sequence (1950-1951)
IDA became autonomous, self-governing,
statutory body on passage of legislation
through all stages, with amendments to
assuage industrialists and protect Authority
members from threat of abolition

Fianna Fail declared it would be abolished
when they returned to power
Industrialists opposed judicial powers to be
granted IDA
Insufficient resources for IDA to do its job

Outcome – Critical Juncture (1951)
Fianna Fáil returned to power. Kept IDA with narrower focus (promote creation of new
industry). Returned all other functions to Department of Industry and Commerce.
Structural Persistence (1951-1958)
IDA focused on new industry. Engaged in building its legitimacy, credibility and influence.
Came around to view that export-led industrialization and FDI needed. Began actively
promoting FDI. Given grant-making power.

(Source: Donnelly, 2007: 151)
Thus, even before coming to the Oireachtas, there were already significant start-up costs
and expectations as to what the IDA would achieve. Such was the investment that, on returning
to power in 1951 once again, rather than abolish the IDA, as it had threatened to do (PDDE,
Vol.119, Cols.1618-1619, 9-March-1950), Fianna Fáil refocused the IDA instead on industrial

9

development, taking away the administrative role that was best seen to rest with civil servants
and freeing it to focus on promoting industrial development (PDDE, Vol.126, Cols.1514-1515,
12-July-1951). Following this critical juncture, the IDA had become established as part of the
nascent industrial development institutional landscape.
The IDA represented layering, in the sense that the protectionist institutional matrix was
left in place, and this layer, while an attempt to improve matters, represented learning effects and
further investment, by way of coordination effects and adaptive expectations, in making
protectionism work. Thus, from 1932, there was built an interdependent institutional matrix in
support of protectionism, resulting in quite substantial complementarities, with institutional
arrangements mutually reinforcing each other. In essence, institutional arrangements constituted
a stable equilibrium, its resilience being such that institutional continuity conditioned change and
exhibited strong tendencies towards only incremental adjustment (Pierson, 2004).
A critical feature of path dependent processes is the relative ‘openness’ or
‘permissiveness’ of early stages in a sequence compared with the relatively ‘closed’ or ‘coercive’
nature of later stages (Abbott, 1997; Mahoney, 2001). This can be seen in the sequence that
emerged in reaction to protectionism, where new conditions were overwhelming the specific
mechanisms that previously reproduced the protectionist path.

Tentative moves were being

made towards an outward-looking orientation, albeit not in any concerted or coordinated fashion
at the outset and from within the definite confines of protectionism. Initially, the IDA favoured
protectionism to encourage indigenous industrial development. However, through experience on
the ground, the IDA’s view gradually changed to seeing export-led industrialisation as the only
way to develop the Irish economy and foreign investment as a source for such industrialisation,
resulting in its recommendation that the restrictions on foreign capital be eased (Walsh, 1983,
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cited in Girvin, 1989: 180-181). The government, in extending the remit of the IDA, began to
actively encourage foreign investment to fill gaps where indigenous industry had failed to seize
opportunities. Subsequently, further modifications were made to facilitate foreign investment,
with industrial policy moving from a focus on import-substitution and indigenous industry to
encouraging exports and foreign investment (PDDE, Vol.163, Col.453, 2-July-1957). Thus,
reflective of learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations, we see a growing
shift in policy, itself requiring the investment of political capital in articulating, supporting and
institutionalising that shift.
Following North (1990: 98-99), therefore, the continuity of protectionism was not
inevitable given that the mechanisms of reproduction were subsequently eroded over the course
of the reactive sequence that paved the way for the emergence of a new equilibrium. As we see,
throughout the late 1940s and the 1950s, the decreasing returns to the protectionist path, when
combined with the effects of population movement, began to erode the mechanisms of
reproduction that generated its continuity. While government sought to bolster protectionism
with mechanisms that included new state organisations (e.g., the IDA, 1949; Córas Tráchtála
Teoranta, 1951; An Foras Tionscal, 1952) and incentives (e.g., capital and training grants, tax
relief on exports) to promote industrial development, this was insufficient to address the
decreasing returns. Of interest is that institutional responses in support of protectionism, to
include the nascent IDA, proved plastic enough to fit with an outward-looking reactive sequence
and institutional matrix developing in parallel, a sequence driven by the need to deal with new
conditions, which included increasing moves towards free trade and mobile investment capital
internationally.
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CHANGING POLICY: FROM PROTECTIONISM TO FREE TRADE
As has already been seen, the rules of the game were changing through the 1950s and successive
governments were becoming more frustrated with protectionism in the face of increasing
inefficiencies. Despite efforts at actively encouraging industrial development and the
development of exports, the inefficiencies of the protectionist path were proving immune to such
incremental change (Department of Finance, 1958a: 2). It was only with the government’s
Programme for Economic Expansion (Department of Finance, 1958b) that all of these efforts
were pulled together into a coherent policy of outward-looking economic development,
underpinned by industrial development that embraced export-oriented, foreign direct investment
(FDI). In marking a critical juncture, this programme represented a significant, path-shifting
investment on the part of government in a highly visible policy that effectively sounded the death
knell for protectionism (see Figure 4 below).

Figure 4: Reorienting the Path from Protectionism to Outward-looking Economic Development
Reactive Sequence (1948-1958)
Inefficiency of protectionism
Saturated domestic market
Migration from land
Increasing unemployment
Increasing emigration
Deteriorating balance of payments

Maintain protection, but more expansive/
proactive industrial policy:
-New organizations (IDA, Córas Tráchtála
Teoranta, An Foras Tionscal)
-Fiscal and capital incentives
-Promote indigenous industrial development
-Promote exports / FDI
Plus, moves internationally dismantling protectionism in favor of free trade, ie, GATT, ECSC, EEC, EFTA
Outcome – Critical Juncture (1958)
Programme for Economic Expansion – presented a coherent policy of outward-looking economic
development, underpinned by industrial development that embraced export-oriented FDI.
Structural Persistence (1958 to present)
Significant investment (political, legislative, organizational, financial) in establishing outwardlooking/export-oriented development, with learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive
expectations sustaining policy reproduction.

(Source: Donnelly, 2007: 207)
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Essentially, the move towards a more outward-looking economic development policy
entailed considerable start-up costs, particularly political and particularly for Fianna Fáil, which
had preached protectionism for two decades.

Representing a fundamental shift in policy,

government had to both divest itself of protectionism and embrace a more open policy that
included accepting foreign investment as a vehicle through which to achieve both industrial and
economic development. Further, it meant government investing in promoting this highly visible
policy change, investing in the creation of new meaning around the new policy and investing in
its implementation. It meant considerable start-up costs for the civil service in reorienting itself
away from managing protectionism to putting in place new institutions to manage a more open
economy. It also meant investing in engagement with ongoing moves internationally towards
freer trade (i.e., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), European Economic Community (EEC), European Free Trade Area
(EFTA)) and the changes such engagement would require, such as the development of
complementary policies, the negotiation and signing of treaties, and the implementation of these
treaties. Further, it meant investment in the development, promotion and implementation of
successor economic development plans that built on, and so reinforced, the path established by
the critical juncture (i.e., Second Programme for Economic Expansion (Department of Finance,
1963, 1964); Third Programme for Economic and Social Development (Department of Finance,
1969)). Equally, these investments were not just monetary, but they were also in reorienting the
collective mindset, disengaging it from the policy of the past and engaging it with the policy of
the future.
From a policy learning perspective (Pierson, 1993), Ireland’s story of economic
development is illustrative of policy constituting ‘important rules of the game, influencing the
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allocation of economic and political resources, modifying the costs and benefits associated with
alternative … strategies, and consequently altering ensuing’ development (Pierson, 1993: 596).
While government shaped the outward-looking economic development policy, following Pierson
(1993), this policy can be seen to have subsequently produced politics, with the policy serving to
shape politics.

This being so, economic development policy can be seen to have produced

resources and incentives (e.g., the IDA, the need to create jobs) for government, with positive
feedback (e.g., jobs created) influencing continued investment in the policy. Such policy
feedback facilitated the expansion in scope and scale of economic development, with economic
development policy shaping industrial development policy, which, in turn, shaped later
developments and served to reinforce the path taken.
The government’s main objective in terms of industrial policy was to create the
conditions necessary for private enterprise to drive industrial development. Thus, in terms of
adaptive expectations, we see it explicitly expressed as part of government policy that protection
is increasingly untenable in a world that is sensed to be moving towards free trade and in
opposition to an industrial development policy that both welcomes foreign participation and is
export-oriented. This new approach to economic development established the path to be
followed and, it is in line with this critical juncture, that moves along the path of export-led
industrialisation and economic cooperation with Europe were subsequently made. It was within
this context that the IDA was reproduced.
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FROM MINOR STATUTORY BODY TO MAJOR STATE-SPONSORED AGENCY:
BUILDING THE IDA
The policy change favouring free trade also marked a critical juncture for the IDA (see Figure 5
below) in focusing its efforts and positioning it as the focal organisation in attracting FDI
(Department of Finance, 1958b: 40), effectively turning it into an investment promotion agency,
with coordination effects and adaptive expectations seeing increases in the organisation’s scope
and resources through the success of its efforts. In the years immediately following this policy
change, and illustrative of learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations, the
IDA invested in marketing campaigns and opened offices in the US and Europe, which garnered
foreign investment for the country, such investment garnering further funding for the IDA to
facilitate its work, each move reinforcing further moves along the burgeoning path of FDI as a
means of achieving industrial development.
In terms of complementary institutional developments, besides the financial incentives
machinery (i.e. various grant schemes), other legislative moves complemented and facilitated the
IDA’s work, particularly in the area of taxation (i.e., export profits tax relief). Through the 1950s
and 1960s, the IDA gradually built the country’s reputation as a base for manufacturing industry
and its reputation and identity as the country’s industrial development organisation. This period
acted as the ‘pilot stage’ in attracting new industries to the country, albeit the pilot provided
much of the manufacturing sector’s diversification and growth (O’Neill, 1972: 44).
The IDA’s success met with operational limitations, however (Little, 1967a). As matters
stood, the IDA operated within the tight constraints of the civil service bureaucracy, with no
control over the assignment or withdrawal of its staff, nor over its structure. On the one hand,
the IDA was being asked to play an increasingly demanding, key role in the country’s economic
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development, while being handicapped on the other through not having the operational
autonomy to deliver on that role. To bring about change, in the late 1960s the IDA engaged US
consultants Arthur D. Little (1967a, b) to assist it in a major reappraisal of Ireland’s industrial
development apparatus. The review concluded that achieving full employment rested on
encouraging foreign firms to establish operations in the country, requiring more than just
charging the IDA with the undertaking; the IDA would also need far greater resources than were
given it, in addition to the capacity and flexibility to control its own operations.

Figure 5: IDA Path from Minor Statutory Body to Major State-sponsored Super-agency
Critical Juncture – Economic/Industrial Development Policy (Figure 4)

Critical Juncture (1958)
Programme for Economic Expansion focused IDA exclusively on promoting/attracting FDI, effectively
turning it into an investment promotion agency
Structural Persistence (1958-1966)
Investment in IDA through development program policy statements, provision of resources.
Learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations yielded increasing investment by way
of financial resources, legislation, FDI investors, jobs, etc.
Reactive Sequence (1966-1969)
IDA and An Foras Tionscail worked as
separate bodiesm with limited autonomy.
IDA promoted FDI and AFT disbursed
industrial development grants to indigenous
and overseas companies

Reviews by Little (1967a), NIEC (1968)
and PSORG (1969) called for streamlining
industrial development agencies through
creation of semi-state superagency with its
own operational autonomy

Outcome – Critical Juncture (1969/70)
Government accepted the review recommendations and drafted the necessary legislation, which was
passed by the Oireachtas as the Industrial Development Act, 1969.
The new IDA came into being on April 1st, 1970.
Structural Persistence (1970-1982)
High fixed set-up costs in establishing the ‘new’ IDA as a semi-state superagency – legislation,
political capital, staff recruitment, financial resources, etc.
Learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations yielded increasing investment by
way of financial resources, legislation, marketing programs, industrial investors, jobs, internal
reorganizations, etc.

(Source: Donnelly, 2007: 207)
All in all, Little (1967a) represented a blueprint that was subsequently followed in recreating the IDA as an autonomous state-sponsored organisation, charged with the key task of
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coordinating and delivering on Ireland’s industrial development policy. Indeed, Padraic White1
noted that it was the IDA itself that both engineered the Little review and directed its content:
Ted O’Neill and company commissioned A.D. Little to write the script. They
basically wrote the script. Because they came to the limits of what you could do
in the Civil Service. Ted O’Neill said, ‘We couldn’t hire a typist. We’d 6
international offices. Imagine all the expenditures involved, promotions involved,
tied with the civil service. We basically commissioned A.D. Little. We basically
wrote the script for them. We basically wrote the legislation. The Government of
the day said, ‘Yes, we want a super-agency that will take this thing to a new
level.’’ That was the 1960s. It was an amazing act. […] I think the influence of
people like Ted O’Neill and Joe Walsh as trusted public servants within the
Department of Industry and Commerce. I think they had a huge influence. As I
say, they were trusted and that thread of how they ended up with A.D. Little and
they said basically ‘we need a new agency.’
Reviews by the National Industrial Economic Council (NIEC, 1968) and the Public
Services Organisation Review Group (PSORG, 1969) echoed and reinforced the reorganisation
recommended in Little (1967a). On foot of these reviews, and by way of critical juncture, The
Industrial Development Act, 1969, streamlined agencies dealing with industrial development and
concentrated the expertise within an expanded IDA having full control over its own internal
operations.

It gave the IDA the status of a state-sponsored organisation having national

responsibility for the furtherance of industrial development, in addition to consolidating
decision-making power concerning industrial development within the organisation. Government
maintained overall control through its power to appoint the IDA’s members, its broad
responsibility for setting industrial policy and its broad control over the organisation’s budget.
Additionally, government pro-actively legitimised the IDA’s role and position, making it clear
through the reorganisation legislation that both industrial development and the IDA’s central role
in it represented a vital, long-term programme for Ireland to which it was committed.
1

Personal interview with Padraic White on May 9th, 2006. Mr. White joined the IDA in 1969 and served as head of
the Home Information Division, then head of the Planning Division, and then Executive Director with responsibility
for planning, regions, public relations, promotions and development cooperation. He succeeded Michael Killeen as
Managing Director in 1981, a position in which he served until 1990.
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Having invested considerable set-up costs in re-creating the IDA, in terms of, for
example, consultants reports, political capital, legislation and dissolution of agencies, the new
IDA came into being as a state-sponsored body on April 1st, 1970. From enactment of the
establishing legislation there followed considerable investment in a highly specific asset, namely
an autonomous industrial development organisation, which entailed physical specificity (e.g., the
IDA as an industrial development organisation, industrial development legislation, policies and
programmes, party political platforms on industrial development, all of which involved design
characteristics particular to industrial development), human specificity (e.g., the IDA’s
specialised knowledge of the industrial development environment resulting from learning-bydoing, and its special relationships with various actors resulting from repeated interactions with
these actors) and dedicated assets, where the value of all assets derived from continuance of
industrial development to which they were applied (Pierson, 2004).
Now vested with the formulation and implementation of national and regional industrial
policy and freed from the shackles of the civil service to manage its own affairs, the IDA put in
place systems, structures and institutional arrangements that have persisted over time. Recreating the IDA entailed introducing a new organisation structure and meeting its expanded
mandate saw the organisation engage in a major recruitment drive. In seeing industrial
development as a ‘cooperative process’, requiring the participation of a range of development
organisations, the IDA from early on saw value in building contacts throughout the country and
devoted significant staff resources to managing them through representations of key personnel on
a range of main boards, committees and organisations (e.g., Córas Tráchtála Teoranta, Shannon
Development, Institute of Public Administration, Irish Council of European Movement, IrelandJapan Economic Association, Regional Development Organisations, County Development
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Teams). It also decided to carry out many of its executive functions through committees, with
delegated grant giving powers, on which other interests participated, e.g., the Confederation of
Irish Industry (CII), the Irish Export Board (IEB), research institutes, universities and
government departments.
The new IDA also invested in creating a Janus-faced organisation (see Figure 6 below),
with one face managing the needs of and relationship with industry and the other face managing
the needs of and relationship with government, very much placing the IDA itself in the position
of a coordinating mechanism, the benefits of its activities being enhanced through coordinating
with the activities of both government and industrial investors. Having the ear of government,
the IDA was active in generating further complementarities with other policy areas, such as
education and physical infrastructure. As the increasingly credible experts, the IDA was in the
unique position of being able to say to government what was needed to facilitate and encourage
industrial development and the delivery of new jobs, such that government listened and acted
accordingly.

Arguably, the IDA was able to use its position to generate increasing

complementarities thereby increasing its value and reinforcing its own position.

Figure 6: IDA as Janus-faced Coordinating Mechanism in 1970
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Building on the learning since promotional activity commenced in 1955, the new IDA
adopted a more intensive and focused method of promotion encompassing a more selective
approach, direct marketing, advertising and public relations. Having identified a sector or niche
area, the task was then to single out the winning companies before they became more widely
known and attractive to other development agencies. Early on, the IDA recognised the
importance of putting ‘our eggs in the best baskets’ (McLoughlin, 1972: 35) and saw opportunity
in influencing the make-up of foreign investment through identifying priority industrial sectors
and established leaders in these sectors to arrive at a portfolio of investment possibilities to which
the organisation applied its marketing effort (IDA, 1970/71: 15-16; O’Neill, 1972). The
attractiveness of industrial sectors was assessed not only according to the criterion of commercial
viability, but also on indicators of national economic benefit, to include: growth potential in
international markets; potential for long-term commercial stability; low probability of
technological obsolescence; potential for high added value in terms of use of indigenous raw
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materials or manufactured products; high content of skilled male labour in total employment; and
low capital-intensity, or if capital-intensity is high, good potential for linkage or spin-off benefits
(IDA, 1974; McLoughlin, 1972; O’Neill, 1972).
Having ascertained priority sectors, the process moved on to identifying and rating
established leading companies according to criteria of commercial soundness, growth potential,
ability to fund new investments, locational mobility and history of responding to advantages of
new investment locations (O’Neill, 1972). As noted by O’Neill (1972: 46-47), in the case of just
one product area, this process whittled 21,000 companies at the start down to 1,235 candidate
companies based on the criteria of interest to the IDA. Projects were rejected where the viability
of the parent company was in question, where the capital intensity would be too great for a small
country with limited resources, where there would be an undue negative effect on the
environment, where Irish political or social mores would reprove the product produced and
where low-cost labour would be the only consideration. Projects considered particularly worthy
came from companies that were leaders in their field, were high-tech, high skill and high added
value, offered long-term growth potential, used the country’s natural resources, presented spinoff prospects to existing firms, provided jobs quickly, located in less developed parts of the
country and helped sell Ireland as an FDI location (Telesis, 1982: 173).
This process yielded a number of priority sectors for future industrial development,
amongst which were electronics, pharmaceuticals and medical technologies, in effect
representing the early part of a sequence that would yield significant results later. For example,
the IDA’s sectoral strategy for the electronics industry was itself formulated in 1974, a strategy
which, over the years, proved successful in the creation of path-dependent industrial clustering
due to agglomeration or coordination effects. As noted by Killeen (1979: 7), ‘[i]n 1974, the IDA
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identified the electronics sector as one which would expand rapidly in the following years. We
prepared a special development strategy for the sector which has been actively implemented’.
Ireland’s comparative advantage in information technology was not given, rather it was created
through a sequence of events unfolding over time, e.g., the IDA’s strategy to focus effort on
developing this sector for inward investment, successes in attracting high profile companies in
the sector, etc., each of these events reinforcing the path-dependent industrial clustering and
yielding increasing returns due to agglomeration or coordination effects. Prior to the selective
strategy that emerged within the IDA in the early 1970s, Ireland had no electronics industry to
speak of, but, by 1982, some 130 of the world’s leading electronics companies were
manufacturing in Ireland (Haughey, 1982: 23).
In effect, and revealing learning effects and adaptive expectations in refining a strategy it
had pursued since the 1960s, the IDA went about attracting leading companies in the field, a
strategy that contributed to increasing returns in the spatial location of production (Arthur, 1994;
Krugman, 1991).

These companies, in turn, attracted suppliers, skilled labour, specialised

services and appropriate infrastructure, and contributed to the development of social networks,
which facilitated the exchange of information and expertise. Further, the presence of these
companies and the concentration of these factors contributed to Ireland’s attractiveness for other
firms in the sector, in effect, acting like magnets and influencing the locational decisions and
investments of these other companies.
Thus, working from within the constrained choice-set presented by the chosen path to
achieving industrial development, namely the active sourcing of foreign investment to create
sustainable jobs, the IDA, on the back of a strong planning process and cognisant of its limited
resources, prioritised industrial sectors and targeted leading companies that the organisation
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expected would deliver a high national economic and social benefit into the future. In essence,
and building on the learning gained from its earlier promotional efforts in using leading
companies to attract others, coordination effects and adaptive expectations came into play in
adopting this selective, targeted approach, with success over time reinforcing the approach such
that it became self-fulfilling. That is, the approach delivered investment and jobs, which
reinforced continued investment in the approach, which delivered further investment and jobs as
agglomeration effects came into play, with the winning companies attracting investment from
others in the sector, this positive feedback itself reinforcing the value of the IDA as an industrial
development organisation, especially when set against the poor performance of indigenous
industry.
By way of delivering results for government, and also by way of focusing the
organisation on its mandate, the IDA instituted a highly quantified approach following its recreation in 1970, which was new to state agencies at the time, namely annual targets for the
creation of jobs, which were made public in advance and subsequently reported on so that the
organisation could be seen to be performing in delivering results (MacSharry and White, 2000:
194). These highly visible performance measures served to reinforce the chosen path to industrial
development, with achievement of targets being evidence to government and the public that the
IDA were delivering results, which encouraged continued investment in the IDA, in turn
delivering on targets and so on. Such were the coordination effects afforded by the IDA in terms
of job creation that, in tandem with learning effects and adaptive expectations, the organisation’s
requests for exchequer funding, for both incentives and administration, were invariably looked
upon favourably.

23

In terms of programme development (e.g., re-equipment and modernisation, product and
process development, service industries, project identification, enterprise development), the
IDA’s programmes are illustrative of the learning-by-doing that occurred over time and that
served to consolidate its position as the national industrial development organisation. All are
indicative of its capacity to learn and to innovate, in the process ensuring its continued relevance
as the focal point in coordinating industrial development policy formulation and implementation.
Effectively, over time, the IDA developed programmes suited to the particular industrial
development challenges it faced, illustrating that a significant amount of learning-by-doing had
occurred in the increasingly complex industrial development system.
While the 1950s and 1960s were about building and consolidating the IDA’s identity,
credibility and legitimacy, following the critical juncture that created the ‘new’ IDA superagency, the 1970s was a period of building the organisational form and further consolidating the
organisation’s credibility and legitimacy. The decade was capped by a progress report (IDA,
1979: 3-4) citing a litany of achievements, including an expanded, autonomous organisation
employing almost 700 highly skilled staff, client company investment of £2.7bn (compared to
£130m in the 1960s) for a total grant commitment of £831m and job approvals of 192,000
(compared to 45,500 for the 1960s), with 99,000 in domestic industry. To all intents and
purposes, it appeared as though the significant investment of resources in the IDA, allied with its
own learning and the increased coordination of policies and activities to fit with its interests, was
delivering according to expectations, this positive feedback reinforcing the IDA as an
organisational form. However, from the relative glory of the 1970s, the IDA moved to more
challenging times in the 1980s.
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BACK TO THE FUTURE: FROM STATE-SPONSORED SUPER-AGENCY TO
AGENCY FOCUSED ON FDI
From a path dependence perspective, the story moves from one of structural persistence to a
reactive sequence that culminates in a critical juncture leading to the reorganisation of the IDA in
1994. According to Wickham (1983), Ireland’s success in attracting FDI lay in the very
particular situation of the IDA. As has already been noted, the organisation was effectively the
sole industrial development body in the country: it had, to Telesis (1982), remained unchallenged
by any power centre either in the country or outside it; it was shielded from political interference
that would have impacted both policy formulation and implementation; its ‘discretionary’
decision-making was suited to dealing with private enterprise; and it was in a position to
legitimate itself to all stakeholders as fulfilling an important national task.
Though Wickham’s (1983) observation points to success with foreign investment,
concerns gradually emerged throughout the 1970s about an over-reliance on such investment and
its tenuous links with the economy, not to mention a dualistic industrial structure and the
influence of external interests on national sovereignty (e.g., Cooper and Whelan, 1973; The
Economist, 1977; Jacobsen, 1978; Kennedy and Dowling, 1975; Long, 1976). These concerns
led the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) to commission a five-part review in 1978
to ensure that government industrial policy was suited to creating an internationally competitive
industrial base in Ireland.
One of the reviews, Telesis (1982), had the greatest impact of all in regard to the IDA and
to industrial development policy. Having experienced a decade of relative glory through the
1970s, Telesis brought the IDA’s legitimacy into question at a time when the country was
experiencing the effects of a global recession, a poor foreign investment climate, mounting
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domestic economic problems and increasing unemployment (IDA, 1980-1983; MacSharry and
White, 2000; Telesis, 1982).
In assessing Ireland’s then industrial policy, Telesis was complimentary on a number of
fronts. It considered that the country had a clearly articulated, very advanced, extensive and
consistent industrial policy, with inventive and energetic state agencies devising programmes to
deliver on policy goals. With particular reference to the IDA, the review observed that it had
succeeded in developing what was arguably the most dynamic, active, efficient and effective
organisation of its kind in the world, with a well-earned reputation as the leading organisation in
the field.
However, the Telesis review also noted weaknesses in industrial policy had contributed
to weaknesses in the country’s industrial structure, thus limiting the success of the country’s
industrial development. The review’s main criticism was that industrial development had largely
depended on FDI, while indigenous industry languished. It criticised the practice of creating and
counting job approvals over the creation and counting of actual jobs delivered, commenting that,
while there was value politically to government and motivationally to the IDA in touting job
approval targets, the gap between approval and reality had the effect of creating expectations in
the general population that were then not met. And from a governance perspective, it noted that,
legally, government departments were responsible for determining strategy with the IDA and
other development agencies responsible for strategy implementation. However, the reality was
that the IDA formulated strategy in line with its job creation mandate, while government
departments were both lacking in staff numbers and information sufficient to formulate strategy
and oversee the implementation of this strategy by the relevant agencies.
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The overall impact of Telesis was to refine both the IDA and industrial development
policy (Department of Industry and Commerce, 1984; IDA, 1981, 1982, 1983). Changes were
bounded and incremental, with the IDA still very much the lead industrial development
organisation. The outcome of Telesis and the debate it engendered was the setting of an adjusted
course, building on past success and reflecting the lessons learned from experience gained to that
point. In many respects, given the complexity of the problems it confronted, i.e., a worsening
fiscal crisis and increasing unemployment, government relied heavily on the pre-existing
industrial development policy and organisational framework, adjusting at the margins to
accommodate the demands of the situation (Pierson, 1993). The above tallies with Hall’s (1989:
11) proposition that ‘prior experience with related policies’ is such that ‘states will be
predisposed towards policies with which they already have some favourable experience.’
While the global recession of the early 1980s, and its effects, engendered an industrial
policy debate, the result was on-path responses entailing layering onto the existing industrial
development institution. The IDA remained the focal organisation, foreign investment remained
an important source for jobs and greater attention was now to be paid to indigenous industry,
with the IDA and government coalescing around this on-path response through their collective
effort at articulating an industrial development policy that validated the approach taken over the
preceding decades and that acknowledged the learning accruing that facilitated incremental
change. It was not a case that the IDA had not been doing anything with indigenous industry;
rather collective learning suggested it needed to invest more into what it was already doing.
With Telesis still very much in the background, the late 1980s witnessed a number of
threats to the IDA in terms of its position as the central industrial development organisation
(MacSharry and White, 2000: 212), while the early 1990s witnessed yet another review of
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industrial policy with major ramifications for the IDA (Department of Enterprise, 1993;
Industrial Policy Review Group, 1992). Representing another critical juncture, the outcome of
the review saw the Department of Enterprise and Employment (formerly the Department of
Industry and Commerce) reclaim the role of determining industrial policy and of supervising its
implementation from the IDA, which was split into three separate organisations.
Thus, the policy refocus recommended from Telesis onwards found subsequent
expression in the formal recreation of the IDA as three separate, autonomous bodies in January,
1994, each with its own board and its own distinct mission and goals. All three agencies operate
within a framework which facilitates cooperation and mutual support, with Forfás, the umbrella
agency, focusing on policy, Forbairt (now Enterprise Ireland) charged with promoting
indigenous industry and IDA Ireland responsible for attracting FDI to Ireland. From the relative
success of the 1970s, the IDA entered the 1980s under a cloud created by the Telesis (1982)
review, which was exacerbated by the poor economic and jobs climate throughout the decade.
The structural persistence that marked the 1970s gave way to a reactive sequence that saw both
questioning of the IDA and the mechanisms generating its continuity, finding subsequent
expression in the critical juncture that brought about recreation of the IDA (see Figure 7 below).
From a path dependence perspective, the change to the IDA as an industrial development
organisation arguably remains within the bounds of the path being pursued since the critical
juncture of the 1950s. What has transpired in the interim is that much policy learning and
organisational learning has ensued, such that the state continued to invest in refining its industrial
development policy and the institutional and organisational arrangements established in support
of that policy. The IDA of 1955 has continued on through to the IDA Ireland of today, in terms
of its sole focus on promoting internationally mobile investment by foreign interests in Ireland.
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The IDA that emerged from the late 1960s, incorporating indigenous along with foreign industry,
was subsequently renegotiated in the early 1990s, such that the organisational structure that
existed internally was externalised through the creation of separate agencies out of the existing
divisional structure.

Figure 7: IDA Path from Industrial Development Super-agency to Agency Focused on FDI
Outcome – Critical Juncture (1969/70)
Government accepted the review recommendations and drafted the necessary legislation, which was passed
by the Oireachtas as the Industrial Development Act, 1969
The ‘new’ IDA came into being on April 1st, 1970
Structural Persistence (1970-1982)
High fixed set-up costs in establishing the ‘new’ IDA as a semi-state superagency – legislation, political
capital, staff recruitment, financial resources, etc.
Learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations yielded increasing investment by way of
financial resources, legislation, marketing programs, industrial investors, jobs, internal reorganizations, etc.
Reactive Sequence (1982-1993)
IDA maintained its position as the
pivotal industrial development
organization
IDA responded with a complete policy
re-think and restructured to address
weaknesses
Government White Paper on Industrial
policy (1984) reaffirmed IDA role and
position and emphasized more
selective approach to industrial
development
IDA, major Government party,
Department of Finance and opposition
parties against splitting IDA

Poor economic climate throughout 1980s
Telesis (1982) review questions IDA performance and
industrial policy
Media castigate IDA performance
Triennial review empowers Shannon Free Airport
Development Company at expense of IDA in midWest region
Questioning re-emerges with Industrial Policy Review
Group and its recommendation to split IDA into
separate indigenous and oversaes organizations
Minister and Department of Enterprise and
Employment and minor Government party accepted
IPRG recommendation
Moriarty implemented IDA restructuring into 3
separate agencies

Outcome – Critical Juncture (1993/94)
Government drafted legislation to split the IDA into 3 separate organizations, which was passed by the
Oireachtas as the Industrial Development Act, 1993
Forfás, Forbairt and IDA-Ireland came into being on January 1st, 1994

(Source: Donnelly, 2007: 207)
CONCLUSION
Taking all of the above together, what emerges is a path dependence picture of the IDA’s
creation within the context of a protectionist path, and subsequent production and reproduction
within the context of a free trade path.

We see the critical junctures marking the turn to

29

protectionism and then to free trade, in addition to the critical junctures marking the IDA’s
establishment, then its focus on development of new industry and re-focus on FDI, followed by
its re-creation as a super-agency with national responsibility for all aspects of industrial
development policy and implementation, and most recently its re-focus on FDI, with its
responsibility for policy development and indigenous industry centred in separate, new agencies.
Post-critical junctures, positive feedback mechanisms come into play to produce and
reproduce structural persistence. We see large set-up costs and ongoing investment, initially in
protectionism and subsequently in a policy geared towards free trade, e.g., policy statements,
policy documents, legislation, new institutions and organisations, ongoing commitment of
resources (financial, political, legislative), etc. We see the knowledge gained in the operation of
both policy regimes contributing to positive feedback in their continued use, such feedback
incurring continued investment aimed at greater efficiency and effectiveness, for example, in the
fine-tuning of legislation and the establishment of complementary organisations. Increased use
of each policy regime encouraged investment in linked and complementary activities, in turn
making each regime more attractive. And adaptive expectations drove continued investment in
both policy regimes to reduce uncertainties, whereby the greater the expectation that policy
would continue in force the greater actions would be adapted to realise those expectations. The
self-fulfilling character of expectations contributed to the policy winning broader acceptance and
increased the dynamic of coordination effects.
We also see such large set-up costs and investment going into the IDA, producing and
reproducing an increasingly specific industrial development asset. Tremendous amounts of
learning by doing has occurred in what has increasingly become a complex system, with the IDA
developing strategies suited to the particular institutional matrix it has confronted. We see
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widespread coordination effects, with particular courses of action encouraged, and others
discouraged, given the anticipated actions of others within the industrial development sphere.
We see growing complementarity between the outward-looking policy of economic development
and the IDA as the increasingly focal organisation delivering on the country’s industrial
development. Coevolving over an extended period of time, the interactions between the two
have created densely linked institutional matrices (North, 1990).
However, we also see that paths have not continued indefinitely, as was the case with
protectionism and with the IDA itself. A reactive sequence emerged in response to the growing
disquiet with protectionism, which culminated in the outcome or critical juncture that saw the
outward-looking economic development policy take its place. The initial fortunes of the IDA
played out within this reactive sequence. Its establishment attracted the threat of abolition by the
opposition and it became bogged down in managing protectionism to the detriment of promoting
industrial development. However, the outcome or critical juncture was favourable to the IDA in
setting it on its path as an industrial development organisation through removing it of its
bureaucratic burden administering the protectionist machine. The critical juncture that saw the
organisation’s role re-focused to attract FDI was influenced by the reactive sequence at the
broader level of economic policy. The subsequent reactive sequence that resulted in the recreation of the IDA as a semi-state super-agency was a response to the perceived and real
inefficiencies of having multiple state agencies dealing with industrial investment and doing so
from within the operational confines of the civil service. And the reactive sequence that began
with the Telesis review in 1982 and culminated in the re-creation of the IDA as three separate
agencies in 1994 reflected ongoing debate over the needs of foreign and indigenous investors,
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the scope of industrial policy and the division and location of policy development and policy
implementation responsibility.
In the final analysis, from relatively contingent and unpredictable beginnings have
coevolved both an institution and an organisational form. In the case of the IDA, both the forces
for structural persistence and those of reactive sequences have contributed to producing and
reproducing an increasingly fine-tuned, specific asset, an organisational form that, ex ante, could
not have been predicted when it was first established.
Today, supporting export-oriented, foreign multinational organisations, which employ
some 136,000 people and account for some €110bn or 70 per cent of total exports, and
continuing to promote and attract inward investment (IDA, 2010), IDA Ireland remains an
important

organisation

in

the

Irish

enterprise

development

institutional

landscape.

Notwithstanding this, with the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditures
(2009: Vol.II, 79-82) report, and its recommendations to rationalise the various aspects of IDA
Ireland and other development agency operations, only time will tell what will become of IDA
Ireland into the future. Notwithstanding appearances, change is ever present.
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